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Abstract This paper investigates audit committee (AC) practices in relation to the
oversight of financial reporting and external auditors. We conducted semi-structured
interviews of Polish public interest entities to explore AC processes in a different
environment from the widely researched Anglo-American model of corporate
governance. The results of the study highlight the complexity and contradictory
nature of solving governance issues in an environment characterized by a high
concentration of ownership. Monitoring is stronger for companies whose dominant
shareholder is a foreign investor. Local firms are generally slower to embrace an AC
as an effective tool of oversight for financial reporting and external auditors. In
general, the processes utilized by ACs are similar to those reported in the literature.
The collected evidence does not provide support for a single dominant theory that
explains the actual practices of ACs. In fact, multivocality proves to be a more
useful approach for explaining various aspects of AC practices.
Keywords Corporate governance  Audit committees  Financial
reporting  Auditors  Poland
1 Introduction
The audit committee (AC) plays an important role in corporate governance. Because
of the separation of corporate management and ownership, supervisory boards
protect shareholders’ interests because managers may not always act in the best
interest of shareholders (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling
1976). Thus, the goal of the board of directors/supervisory board is to oversee
management activities. Because of the diverse responsibilities of a board of
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directors/supervisory board, some of its oversight responsibilities must be delegated
to various committees. The role of an AC is to oversee financial reporting, internal
control, external auditors, and business risks. The importance of ACs has recently
been emphasized after a series of financial scandals at the turn of the century, with
Enron as the most spectacular.
ACs have attracted increasing attention from regulators, practitioners, and
researchers. A number of accounting firms and practitioners have advocated
approaches and guidelines for more effective ACs (KPMG 2004). A number of these
recommendations have been incorporated into well-known laws and regulations, such
as the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in the United States (US) and the Combined Code in
the United Kingdom (UK). Regulators have assigned various duties to auditing
committees, including the oversight of financial reporting and external auditors. These
two duties are considered important factors in ensuring both the integrity of financial
reporting and the ability of financial consumers to make informed decisions.
At the European level, the European Parliament and Council amended the Eighth
Directive on Company Law requiring public interest companies to establish an AC,
which shifted the focus from the need for ACs to the effectiveness of existing ACs.
The amended directive thus created broader possibilities to study ACs outside of the
environment of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance.
Prior research (Aguilera et al. 2008) indicates that the interdependencies of
companies and their business environments and cultures can lead to differences in
effective governance practices. Thus, there is no reason to assume that the solutions
that are suitable in a specific environment will be efficient in a different setting. In
addition, a number of previously published works call for AC research outside of the
Anglo-Saxon world (DeZoort et al. 2002; Bedard and Gendron 2010; Carello et al.
2011; Bo¨hm et al. 2012).
The goal of this paper is to study ACs (and, therefore, corporate governance and
accounting in action) as described by Gendron (2009). A number of accounting
researchers have been called upon to study social objects—including accounting—
by employing diverse perspectives and lenses (Cooper and Morgan 2008; Burchell
et al. 1980; Hopwood 1983). Because social interactions (including corporate
governance practices) can be complex, ambiguous, and contradictory, there has been
a call for more context-based studies of ACs. The practices of ACs are vital to better
understand and improve our knowledge of the substance of AC activities and the role
of ACs in ensuring the overall effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms
(Spira 1999; Turley and Zaman 2004; Gendron and Be´dard 2006; Gendron 2009).
This paper offers a potential contribution to the literature by providing further
insights into specific AC processes in a setting outside the Anglo-Saxon corporate
governance model. It is a response to calls for research into governance processes
(not simply governance characteristics, such as independence and financial
expertise) and for examination of corporate governance in different settings,
particularly in countries that do not follow the Anglo-American governance model
(Carcello et al. 2002; Bedard and Gendron 2010; He et al. 2009). For instance,
Bedard and Gendron (2010) noted in their summary that ‘‘our review also highlights
important gaps in the literature. Most studies are relational and explanatory; few are
exploratory, descriptive and transformative. Psychological and sociological
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perspectives of analysis are neglected. Knowledge is scant on ACs in jurisdictions
that do not follow the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance. Further,
research on dynamics surrounding AC processes is scarce.’’
Unlike other papers that have explored the effectiveness of ACs in general, this
paper provides greater insight into specific aspects of AC effectiveness in an insider
setting. Previous studies have indicated that the effectiveness of ACs has increased
over time. Based on US data, Beasley et al. (2009) concluded that AC members strive
to provide effective monitoring of financial reporting and to avoid serving on
ceremonial ACs. However, in the six specific AC process areas that were
investigated (accepting and continuing due diligence processes, selecting AC
nominees, AC meeting processes, AC oversight of financial reporting processes,
oversight of internal and external audit processes, and other AC activities), the
evidence is mixed. By performing a more in-depth investigation of selected
processes connected to financial reporting and external auditors (and by identifying
the strengths and weaknesses of practices related to these processes), this paper may
have implications for improving the overall quality of corporate governance.
In addition, this study offers evidence about practices in a corporate governance
system characterized by a high concentration of ownership. The background for the
development of a free-market economy consists of the establishment of capital
markets and effective capital market institutions. In Polish corporate governance,
these specific developmental features are associated with the manner in which
privatization was executed during the transition from a centrally planned economy to
a market-based economy. The privatization program in Poland led to a capital market
characterized by significant concentration of ownership. The structure of sharehold-
ing has changed over time, with the average shareholdings of the largest owners in
privatized firms at 34 % in 1996 and 50 % in 2000. The highest ownership
concentrations (up to 75 %) are observed in firms that have been bought by foreign
investors (Grosfeld and Hashi 2007). Another reason for choosing Poland as a
research site is that it has a relatively young capital market and is representative of
countries of the so-called ‘‘New (enlarged) Europe’’; Poland entered the EU in 2004
after a rapid economic transformation. Although there has been some global
convergence in AC practices, the effectiveness of ACs in transition economies may
be limited by the availability of appropriate human resources and the time to develop
effective AC practices. This may be particularly apparent in an environment with
concentrated ownership, in which strong owners enjoy the benefits of private control
and may restrain the initiatives and incentives of other shareholders to acquire
information and control managerial decisions. An AC’s effectiveness in this
‘‘insider’’ model of corporate governance is likely to be limited.
Given the fragmentary nature of the evidence about corporate governance in
general (and with papers focusing primarily on the Anglo-Saxon world), this study
provides additional insight into corporate governance in Poland. Based on the above
discussion, three sets of research questions emerge for this study:
1. How do ACs perform their monitoring duties regarding the oversight of
financial reporting and external auditors? How are ACs involved in the process
of external auditor selection?
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2. What resources are available to ACs for effectively performing these duties?
3. What are the critical factors that affect AC efficiency? Does an environment
characterized by a high concentration of ownership influence the practices and
processes of ACs?
This paper is structured in seven parts. Section 1 introduces the context and presents
the main reasons for undertaking this study. Section 2 presents a literature review
related to AC effectiveness and, more specifically, to AC processes and resources.
Section 3 introduces the context of the present study by providing background
information about the corporate governance system and ACs in Poland. Section 4
offers information about the research method. Section 5 presents the findings of the
AC. Section 6 provides a discussion using the three sets of guiding research
questions as an organizational framework. Section 7 summarizes our conclusions
and illustrates possible directions for further research.
2 Audit committee (AC) research
A review of the literature reveals that a number of papers have presented summaries of
research or meta-analyses about ACs (DeZoort et al. 2002; Cohen et al. 2004; Turley
and Zaman 2004; Cohen et al. 2007; He et al. 2009; Bedard and Gendron 2010; Carello
et al. 2011). Most papers have examined a variety of process issues primarily by
interviewing both AC members and internal and external auditors. These studies have
found contradictory evidence about substantive/ceremonial and formal/informal AC
processes. This literature review indicates that the resources (characterized mainly by
independence, knowledge, and expertise) in the hands of ACs have generally
increased over time, particularly in the post-SOX period. An overview of the AC
literature related specifically to AC processes and resources is presented below.
Beasley, Besley et al. (2009) examined the AC process by exploring practices in
42 US public companies in the post-SOX era and found a variety of AC practices.
However, AC members are increasingly becoming more engaged in the substantive
monitoring of financial reporting.
Cohen et al. (2002) studied auditor experiences in their interactions with ACs and
boards of directors in the US and the resulting effects on the audit process. They
found that auditors’ experiences with ACs were less than satisfactory. ACs were
often found to lack the financial expertise, authority and skepticism necessary to be
effective. The auditors came to understand the ACs as passive governance
instruments that played merely a ritualistic role. In a later study from the post-SOX
era, the same authors (Cohen et al. 2010) found that the role of the AC had changed:
auditors now considered the board and the control environment as important actors
in a firm’s governance structure. However, management was still understood to be
the key driver in determining auditor appointments and terminations, although
certification requirements by CEOs and CFOs had a positive effect on the integrity
of financial reporting. ACs were considered to have sufficient expertise and
authority to fulfill their responsibilities; members of ACs played important roles in
overseeing internal controls, maintaining reporting quality, ensuring sufficient audit
fees, identifying risks, asking challenging questions, and overseeing the whistle-
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blowing process. In yet another study, Cohen et al. (2007) found that auditors
perceived ACs to be more diligent, active, and expert after the introduction of SOX.
However, Fiolleau et al. (2013) reported a significant involvement of management
in the auditor selection process.
Gendron et al. (2004) provided insights into AC meeting practices, including
meetings in which members met privately with auditors. The study highlighted the
key matters that AC members emphasized during meetings, such as the accuracy of
financial statements, the appropriateness of the wording used in financial reports, the
effectiveness of internal controls, and the quality of work performed by the auditors.
The ACs that was examined generally perceived themselves as effective.
In the UK, Spira (1999, 2002, 2003) determined that AC activities were more
ceremonial in nature and that the AC was a seeker and provider of comfort to CFOs
and various consumers of auditing and financial statements and reports. Another
study by Turley and Zaman (2007) determined that AC’s greatest impact was
represented in informal processes, such as meetings with auditors or management.
Studies related to AC effectiveness indicate an increasing demand for AC
resources and responsibilities (Carcello et al. 2002; Carcello and Neal 2000;
DeZoort 1997; DeZoort et al. 2002; DeZoort and Salterio 2001). DeZoort et al.
(2002) provided a framework for the evaluation of AC effectiveness and
synthesized the literature into four components: AC composition, AC authority,
AC resources and AC diligence.
Vafeas (2001) found that members appointed to an AC had significantly less
board tenure with the firm, served on fewer committees and were less likely to serve
on other committees. AC members were more likely to be ‘‘grey’’ directors (with a
past or present relationship with the firm or its management). Carcello et al. (2002)
examined the US market by looking at AC disclosures in charters and reports. The
authors reported discrepancies between descriptions of ACs and their actions. The
findings of the study indicate that there was a generally high level of compliance
across firms with respect to compulsory disclosures and voluntary disclosures of AC
activities were more prevalent in larger companies with independent ACs. Prior to
enactment of SOX, studies also reported a large number of grey directors on ACs
(Vicknair et al. 1993). Studies related to AC independence suggest a correlation
with the independence of the board (Klein 2002; DeZoort and Salterio 2001).
As for knowledge and expertise, DeZoort (1997) found that AC members were
not fully aware of their formal responsibilities when comparing their responses to
those reported in a company’s proxy statement. This experimental study showed
that AC members with experience were more likely to execute effective oversight of
the external auditor. Because it selects the AC, the board exerts significant influence
on AC quality (Beasley and Solterio 2001).
Collier and Zaman (2005) studied the AC concept in the European setting and
found that it has become accepted in European governance codes in countries with
both one- and two-tier corporate governance systems. Turley and Zaman (2007)
found that informal networks between AC participants condition the AC’s impact
and that the most significant effects of the AC on governance outcomes occur outside
the formal structures and processes. In a developing country setting, Al-Twoijry et al.
(2002) found that AC resources in Saudi Arabia were limited and that AC members
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lacked terms of reference, restrictions on the scope of work, independence, a working
relationship with external and internal auditors, and experience.
Gendron and Be´dard (2006) adopted a social constructivist approach to better
understand the processes by which meanings regarding AC effectiveness are
internally developed and sustained within the small group of people who attended
AC meetings. Drawing on Latour (1987), the researchers argued that perceptions of
the actors involved in internal processes constitute an ‘‘obligatory passage point’’ to
make sense of and understand the effectiveness of ACs. Their paper examined the
processes by which meanings of effectiveness are internally produced within the
small group of actors involved in the corporate governance process.
The importance of corporate governance for emerging market economies has been
widely recognized. However, the debate has focused on issues such as privatization,
board composition, executive compensation, hostile takeovers and shareholder
activism, corporate governance disclosures, and the general performance of corporate
governance systems (Mickiewicz 2009; Berglof and Sarmistha 2007; Mallin and
Ranko 2000; Koładkiewicz 2001; Filatotchev et al. 2007a, b, c; Filatotchev 2006;
Tamowicz and Dzierzanowski 2003). The research related to ACs in this context is
limited. Zain and Subramaniam (2007) examined internal auditors’ perceptions of AC
interactions in Malaysia. They found no clear reporting lines and infrequent
interaction of internal auditors with ACs. Al-Twoijry et al. (2002) studied AC
practices in Saudi Arabia and concluded that ACs lack the resources to be effective.
In sum, ACs are well researched social objects in the setting of the Anglo-
American governance model. However, the review of literature indicates a gap in
knowledge related to the other setting like insider model of corporate governance,
characterized, among others by high concentration of ownership. Also, a review of
literature on corporate governance in emerging markers indicates little understand-
ing of AC practices this context.
3 Setting up the context: corporate governance and ACs in Poland
Despite the scarcity of published literature on ACs in developing countries, studies
show that these countries are making efforts to improve their corporate governance
systems. International organizations such as the World Bank and the Organization
of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) provide guidelines for
corporate reforms in many developing countries. The European Union (EU) is
also undertaking efforts to reform the corporate governance systems of its member
states (Official Journal of the European Union 2005). At the local level, regulators
and local stock exchanges have also introduced changes and new requirements
related to corporate governance, often in the form of Corporate Governance Codes
(CGCs), which are a set of best-practice recommendations regarding the behavior
and structure of the board (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2009).
Poland is an example of these changes outside the well-researched Anglo-Saxon
world. The Polish corporate governance system in its current stage has emerged
over the last 20 years with reforms that simultaneously encompass ownership
transformation and the building of a market-based financial system, including the
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establishment of a capital market (Koładkiewicz 2001). The contemporary
corporate governance system in Poland can be characterized as the ‘‘insider’’
model of corporate governance, in which owners monitor, oversee, and control
companies from within. In this model, owners frequently take large ownership
stakes in individual companies and actively cooperate with management, which
enables investors to retain direct hierarchical control over management and reduce
agency costs. Therefore, individual investors often have large ownership stakes. In
the insider model of corporate governance, the board of directors is often replaced
by a supervisory board.
Since 1990, Poland has successfully walked down the path toward a market
economy. This rapid economic transition could not have been achieved without a
rapid privatization program and the establishment of a vibrant stock market. The
Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) opened its first trading session on April 16, 1991
with only five listed companies. Today, the WSE is a medium-sized stock exchange
with a leading position in Central and Eastern Europe, with a main market
capitalization on December 31, 2010 of 201,132.32 million Euros and 400 traded
companies.
The rapid development over the transition period has aimed at catching up with
developed economies (through neither evolution nor revolution) and improving
capital market and financial institutions. Unlike mature markets in which strong
corporate governance mechanisms are considered a precondition of an effectively
functioning capital market, corporate governance and capital markets develop
simultaneously in emerging economies (Dobija and Klimczak 2010). In 2011, the
Polish governance system may be characterized as follows:
(a) A continental model of a two-tiered governance system in which the
supervisory and management boards are separate. Consequently, the indepen-
dence of the supervisory board members is a problematic issue. Since 2002, the
CGC recommended the presence of independent supervisory board members;1
however, this recommendation was rarely adhered to (Dobija et al. 2011).
(b) A significant ownership concentration with dominant shareholding, in which
the dominant shareholder’s stake is approximately 41 % and executives are the
most frequent dominant shareholders (Aluchna 2007). Aluchna also notes that
the significant dominance of executives in ownership is the result of a pyramid
approach in which many domestic companies are controlled by the executives
of a parent company.
(c) Low enforceability of external monitoring mechanisms and transparency rules
(Kuchenbeker 2008).2
1 The 2002 and 2005 Codes recommended that half the supervisory board’s members be independent.
Because this recommendation is the most frequently rejected rule by companies, the 2008 amendment in
the CGC introduced a requirement of at least two independent board members. With respect to
independence criteria, the board is supposed to use the EU Directive as of February 15, 2005.
2 Of the 368 listed companies, only 230 submitted their compliance reports to the WSE in 2008 (Smardz
2008). The most common forms of non-compliance in the area of good practices of supervisory boards
include rules to form an AC, to publish information on corporate websites, and to carry out a self-
evaluation of the supervisory boards (Kuchenbeker 2008).
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(d) Weak investor protection (Aluchna and Koładkiewicz 2010, Koładkiewicz
2011).
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) describe two possible mechanisms for
corporate code implementation, mandatory and voluntary. The first mechanism
implements codes through the development of corporate legislation, such as SOX.
The second mechanism uses voluntary self-regulation and is based on the rule of
‘‘comply and explain,’’ in which it is not required that companies comply with all
code recommendations. Instead, companies are required to state how they have
applied the principles in the code; non-compliance must be justified (e.g., the UK
Combined Code of 2009).
Initially, Poland chose the second mechanism of CGC implementation—self-
regulation. Seven years later, the voluntary principles related to the existence of
ACs were replaced by mandatory regulation. When the first CGC3 was introduced in
Poland in 2002, there was no direct reference to an AC. However, one of the rules
recommended the presence of an independent supervisory board member while
selecting an external auditor. The second version of the CGC, issued in 2005,
recommended the creation of an AC and a remuneration committee. The CGC
recommended that all members of an AC be independent. The 2005 CGC also
recommended a rotation of external auditors every 5 years. These independence
criteria were deemed too strong for an emerging corporate governance system
characterized by a high concentration of ownership. Thus, after 3 years of
experience with the CGC, a new version was created that relaxed the requirements
regarding the committees and their membership. The 2008 CGC recommended at
least two independent board members and abolished the recommendation for a
remuneration committee. The CGC continued to recommend the creation of an AC
with at least one independent member with ‘‘competence’’ in the area of accounting
and finance. For the criteria related to independence (and for a detailed description
of the responsibilities of the AC), the CGC recommended the use of the EU
recommendations (Official Journal of the European Union 2005). A timeline for the
development of corporate governance regulation in Poland, including regulations
for ACs, is presented in Table 1.
With the changes to the Eighth EU Company Law Directive on 17 May 2006, the
EU countries began the process of adjusting their regulations to the European Law.
In 2009, Poland issued new legislation regulating the role of ACs. The new
regulation was included in a Parliamentary Act on Certified Auditors, their Self-
government, and Entities Authorized to Audit Financial Statements and Public
Supervision (Journal of Laws 2009). The establishment of the AC on a supervisory
board was now formally requested, and the responsibilities of the AC were set on a
mandatory basis. The responsibilities listed in the Act included the oversight of
financial reporting, internal control systems, internal audits, risk management, and
external audits, in addition to establishing the independence of the auditor. The Act
3 The Corporate Governance Code presents a weak form of implementing corporate governance
standards by adopting the ‘‘comply or explain’’ rule as recommended by the Cadbury Report. Under this
rule, companies must file a compliance report with the specific corporate governance principles or explain
the extent of the non-compliance with corporate governance principle(s).
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also specified that the AC recommend an audit firm. According to the regulation, the
AC should have at least three members, at least one of who should be independent
and possess qualifications in accounting or financial auditing. A summary of the
Polish regulations and legislation related to ACs is presented in Table 2.
It is rather surprising that AC regulations are included in the legislation related to
accounting and auditing. The WSE does not have an enforcement mechanism for
the establishment of ACs. Companies are requested only to submit a compliance
report in which information about the AC should be included.
4 Research method
This study adopts an exploratory qualitative study method to examine AC practices
in transitioning economy. Qualitative studies are generally better than quantitative
studies at exploring a new phenomenon; they offer better descriptions of the
phenomenon because they permit details naturally suppressed in studies of large
samples (Silverman 1985; Patton 2002).
One of the important aspects of qualitative and interpretive research is a well-
kept balance between rigor and openness (Ahrens and Chapman 2006). Openness
can be achieved through methodological flexibility and multivocality, which,
according to Gendron (2009:127), are not independent of one another. Methodo-
logical flexibility allows for the adoption of data collection and analysis according
to the emergence of important trends and patterns from the data. For instance,
Table 1 Timeline of Polish regulations in the context of corporate governance reforms in the US and UK







SOX (2002), AICPA (2005),
COSO II (2004), PCAOB (2004)





The Smith report (2003)
The Combined Code (2006, 2008)






Poland Corporate Governance Code
(2002a, 2002b, 2005)
Code of Best Practices for WSE
Listed Companies (2007, 2010,
2012)
Act of auditors and their self-
government, entities authorized
to audit financial statements and
public supervision (7 May 2009)
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Patton (2002) stressed that the researcher is not required to be locked into rigid
methodological designs that eliminate responsiveness. Multivocality, however,
relates to the belief that diverse theories can be simultaneously descriptive of a
reality, as no single theory, perspective of analysis, or method of producing
knowledge can account for the complexity of human behavior (Gendron 2009:127).
The primary research was conducted from January 2009 to June 2010. In May 2009,
a new auditing act was introduced in Poland, which became effective in 2010. The new
legislation required the establishment of ACs and their active involvement in financial
reporting oversight as well as cooperation with external auditors. It was assumed that
the introduction of the new regulation would not have a direct influence on the research
sample—particularly in relation to the second stage of the research—as the companies
in question were selected because their AC was active. The new legislation could be
considered to have institutionalized practices previously in existence. Because the
research focused on the practices of ACs in companies in which ACs were previously
functioning, the archival data analysis concentrated on the information reported by
companies in relation to the practices of ACs that were previously active. The new
legislation was likely to affect the number of companies reporting the existence of an
AC but less likely to change the practices of existing committees.
The subjects of our study were the ACs of companies listed on the WSE. The
primary data were collected during fieldwork. The archival documentation was
reviewed and interviews were conducted. The archival data were primarily obtained
from publicly available sources such as corporate websites and financial data services,
in addition to from the companies directly. Reports and charters of supervisory boards
and ACs were retrieved. Other documentation, such as annual reports and corporate
governance reports filed with the WSE, were reviewed for 2009.
Table 2 Summary of the Polish legislation related to ACs
Regulations Description
Code of Best Practices for WSE Listed Companies
(effective from 1.01.2012)
The document sets out a requirement of
establishing an AC with at least with one
independent member
The supervisory board (AC) should provide
information on financial aspects at the
shareholders meeting
The Act of 19 February 2009 on current and
periodic information provided by issuers of
securities and on conditions under which
information required by legal regulations of a
third country may be recognized as equivalent
Sets the preparation requirements of a corporate
governance code compliance report, including
information about establishing (or not) an AC
The Accounting Act of 29 September 1994
(Journal of Laws of 2009, No. 152, item 1223, as
amended)
The document sets out the requirements of the
supervisory board (together with the management
board) to ascertain whether financial reports meet
the requirements defined by the Accounting Act
Act of auditors and their self-government, entities
authorized to audit financial statements and
public supervision dated 7 May 2009 (Journal of
Laws No. 77 of 2009, item 649)
The Act defines the tasks of the AC and provides




Semi-structured in-depth interviews with AC members were conducted. To ensure
construct validity (McKinnon 1988), the questions were designed to reflect the
following key theoretical constructs (Silverman 1985; Patton 2002): the resources and
expertise of the AC, the meeting process, involvement in external auditor selection,
and oversight of financial reporting and other issues, including AC efficiency. The
research instrument included a set of 20 questions divided into 4 groups (Appendix 1).
In accordance with standard practices of qualitative research, the interview questions
were refined during the fieldwork period based on the responses of the interviewees
(Yin 2003). The respondents were informed about the purpose of the session. Prior to
the interview, they were instructed that the interview’s purpose was to collect their
own experiences with ACs and that, therefore, they should not be afraid of providing
incorrect answers. The interviewed AC members were assured that their responses
would be used in strict confidence. They were also asked for their permission to record
the interview. To provide a reasonable comfort level related to sensitive data, the
interviewees who allowed session recordings were also instructed that, in the case of
sensitive information, they could ask the interviewer to switch off the recording
device. In the event of such a request, the interviewer took notes and recorded a
summary of the missing parts immediately after the interview.
The subjects of the study were AC members of companies listed on the WSE. In
total, 16 interviews were conducted. Because AC practices are relatively new
phenomena, it was difficult to gain access to many AC members willing to share
their insights into their AC’s practices. We began the research with the goal of
interviewing 30 AC members; however, only 16 persons agreed to be interviewed.
One of the main reasons given for rejection was the that development practices in
the candidate’s AC remained in its early stages. Details of the participants, the
companies selected, and the interviews are presented in Appendix 2. Most of the
interviews were recorded and transcribed. A draft report was presented to the
interviewees to allow for comments on the reliability, validity and overall credibility
of the observations and conclusions (Patton 2002).
Once the data had been collected, collated, and transcribed for each stage, they were
manually coded using the key theoretical constructs (Ahrens and Dent 1998). Patterns
and exceptions were identified in the coded data (Ahrens and Dent 1998). Two
independent coders read all materials independently of one another and coded them
into the same summary table. Coding differences were discussed and resolved by the
two coders. The patterns that emerged from the data were then compared with prior
research on ACs. The results were documented once this process was complete. A
similar process of pattern identification was undertaken for the document review
process. This process is consistent with the pattern matching described by Ahrens and
Dent (1998). The results section of the paper discusses the elements coded in this table.
5 Results
This study determined that the AC construct may be adopted in a setting outside the
Anglo-American world. However, during the dominance of the best-practice model,
the process of adoption was rather slow and was generally apparent only in the case
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of the largest listed companies. The evidence collected in this paper does not
provide a clear picture of the effectiveness of ACs. Some organizations, particularly
those with majority shareholding in the hands of foreign investors, implement AC
practices and processes aimed at the effective monitoring of management. In other
cases, when dominant shareholding is in the hands of management or one
entrepreneurial family, the picture is a bit different. In these cases, the need for an
effective AC is more relaxed, as the monitoring of management can be undertaken
directly by the owners.
The following three subsections present the major findings from the interviews
on the oversight of financial reporting and external auditor processes (Sect. 5.1),
critical resources required for effective monitoring (Sect. 5.2), and the critical
factors affecting AC efficiency (Sect. 5.3).
5.1 AC oversight of financial reporting and external auditor processes (Q1)
The interview records of the actual practices related to the setting/reviewing of
accounting policies and of alternative accounting treatments are mixed and range
from no monitoring to a more substantial overview, which is actually consistent
with previous studies (Beasley et al. 2009). The data analysis reveals that
approximately 30 percent of ACs did not set/review accounting policies or
alternative accounting treatments. In many cases, AC members considered financial
reporting to be the domain of the management board and felt no reason to interfere
beyond simply accepting the policies without discussion. One respondent suggested
minimal involvement, whereas nearly 70 % confirmed some engagement in the
setting of accounting policies. However, when performing this oversight, AC
members primarily relied on the external expertise and judgment of the external
auditors in most cases. An internal auditor would sometimes also be questioned
about the appropriateness of a selected accounting policy and alternative accounting
treatments.
Participant 8:
We are not concerned with accounting policies as there is something like IFRS
and all public companies have to use them. You look at the most recent auditor’s
report and you see if the company uses accounting policies in the right way.
Sometimes, we also discuss some specific issues, like accounting policy and cost
allocation procedures. But usually there are only one or at most two members of
the supervisory board who seem to understand anything from the discussion.
For the oversight of financial risks (similar to the oversight of accounting
policies), the degree and scope of the involvement also varied among respondents.
However, the data revealed that the respondents were more concerned with financial
risks than accounting policies and alternative accounting treatments, and they
seemed to be more confident in their ability to monitor risk. There was also some
evidence that AC members were directly involved not only in the monitoring
process but also in the design of the risk-reporting systems. Some respondents were
fairly confident in their ability to monitor financial risk and described the models
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they built or used in their work. Others, however, were more skeptical about their
ability to grasp all the possible risks and noted that systematic risk was something
that could, to some degree, be monitored at a relatively low cost. Again, one
respondent suggested that the oversight of financial risks comes from the external
auditor, who was also responsible for the preparation of a monitoring report. As one
respondent described:
Participant 1:
There are two types of risk: systematic and unsystematic. I will not be able to
say anything about unsystematic risk, except that it may happen. We are more
concerned with systematic risk, and this is what we can better control and
eliminate. We set a gold standard, silver standard or brown standard. But what
we really want to have is a red flag system to signal that something is wrong,
although we are unable to prevent more substantial unusual events.
The interviews confirmed AC participation in the selection of external auditors.
However, their involvement and activity in this process varied. In practice, the
requirement to exclude management from the process of selecting an external
auditor was not fully met, and management frequently and actively participated in
both the search for and selection of an auditor. The letter of inquiry was typically
sent at the request of the AC by the company’s administrative department, which
handled the affairs of the committee. The tenders for auditing services were
submitted to management’s administrative department (or other administrative
department of the company) and analyzed there. Management often actively
participated in the process of assessing the tenders and in elaborating a short list of
potential auditing companies, which was later presented to the members of the AC.
Subsequently, the AC short list of potential auditing companies was then presented
for approval at a meeting of the supervisory board.
Some of the respondents briefly presented the issues related to selecting an
independent auditor.
Participant 6:
The management searches for an external auditor. The AC is not involved in
this process. Naturally, we can suggest during the meeting: ‘‘Do not take
company X, take company Y’’.
Others confirmed the involvement of management in the process of selecting an
independent auditor, but they also noted that certain solutions were applied that
were supposed to create awareness among all the actors in the process regarding
who was responsible for the choice of the auditor.
Participant 16:
…the general idea is to, where possible, always emphasize and create the
awareness, both on the side of the management and of the auditing company
or candidate for auditing company, that it is the supervisory board, which is
represented by the AC, who hires the auditing company and not the
management. There are subtle ways of doing this, for example, the letter of
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invitation to tender. This letter may be signed by the CEO, but the letter itself
emphasizes that it is on behalf of the AC that the invitation is sent and that the
meeting will be held with the AC. We collect the tenders, make a short list,
meet with the companies on this list, negotiate the terms and conditions,
formulate recommendations and then go to the supervisory board, who makes
the final choice.
Further analysis confirmed the participation of management in the selection
process. In half of the analyzed cases, the AC had not even met with the
representatives of the auditing companies before making the decision to recommend
a given auditing company to the supervisory board. In only one case did the AC
meet twice with the potential auditors; in the other cases, they only met once. In
most cases, management representatives took part in these meetings. Most of the
respondents did not see anything wrong with the management actively participating
in the selection process. Some even emphasized that this participation is necessary
because management would be collaborating with the independent auditor on a
daily basis, which is why it was important that there be a ‘‘good vibe’’ between the
auditor and the management. Notably, this asymmetry of authority, with significant
management control in the selection of an external auditor, has also been
documented in the Anglo-American context (Humphrey and Moizer 1990; Gendron
and Be´dard 2006; Cohen et al. 2010; Fiolleau et al. 2013).
Participant 9:
The entire procedure is rather burdensome from the point of view of a member
of the AC, who works full-time somewhere and who needs to spend the entire
day at the company to listen to one-and-a-half-hour long presentations of the
successive companies of the Big Four, which are really all the same, only
trying to capture the subtle differences, which might in the end become the
deciding factor. This is tiring and tedious. Subsequently, we discuss the
options, taking into account the opinion of the management, of course. After
all, it is the management that will be working with the auditor on a daily basis,
not me. In such a case, the human factors also play an important role.
The analysis of the criteria taken into account when selecting an independent
auditor was also notable. In the opinion of the respondents, the most important
factor was the reputation of the auditing company, followed by the level of
experience in the given industry and the price of the service. Reputation was usually
identified with the auditing companies of the ‘‘Big Four.’’
Participant 1:
…It is reputation that matters. We do not care about experience in the industry
because every auditing firm has the same industry experience. In other words,
if you take someone from the Big Four, they will have industry experience
because there is industry experience in the world; and if they don’t, they will
buy the necessary experience.
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In only one case did the AC use a formal tool in the process of selecting an
independent auditor. The other respondents admitted to the lack of such tools but
indicated that they had plans to create an assessment tool of auditor candidates in
the future.
The respondents noticed a recent (and significant) change in the practice of
external and internal auditor oversight. Because auditors demonstrated a more
active attitude, the AC was also compelled to increase its activity.
Participant 15:
…This is also changing. Previously, the board did not meet with the auditor at
all. Only later, when the report was submitted, did the board meet with the
auditor. So the auditor would present the report and say that he has no
objections. So generally there was no reason to meet with the auditors because
they always wrote the same thing, i.e., that they have no objections and that
they do not take any responsibility. However, in the last two, three, four years,
auditors have started to be more active and write all types of things.
Consequently, the AC meets more often with the auditor now and they discuss
different matters.
However, raising the requirements with respect to the role of the AC in an
effective oversight system (which was enforced by, among other things, introducing
regulations related to the responsibility of the supervisory board members for
financial reporting) is an adequate mechanism for increasing the motivation and
activity of the AC. Most of the respondents confirmed that there was continuous
collaboration with the independent auditor and that the auditor was present during
all meetings of the AC. In addition, the form of communication with the auditor has
become increasingly important. ACs expected comprehensive and prompt commu-
nication on the relevant threats and risks to the company.
Participant 7:
The most important thing is that the auditor immediately and directly
communicates all his suspicions of any irregularities or threats. Such a direct
form of communication with the AC is very important. We want to make sure
that all the threats will be communicated immediately after identifying them
and that they will be communicated directly. Previously, we dealt with
different situations. Any objections were usually formulated on the twentieth
page and in small print. Taught by experience, we have decided that we want
to have an auditor who will place such things on the first page.
The scope of the information presented also changed. In some cases, standard
reports were elaborated, but in others, the AC requested detailed information. The
scope of the information the auditors had to prepare varied, depending on the
current needs and discussed issues during the AC’s meetings.
Participant 14:
It is obvious that this is a learning process for the auditors as well. In other
words, until recently, they were not able to state anything else than what was
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written on the first page. When asked about, e.g., benchmarking, comparison,
they did not have a clue what they were asked. I asked one of our auditors a
question like that during a meeting of the supervisory board. I asked about
benchmarking, to present our position in the industry. The auditor responded
calmly that this does not fall within the scope of his tasks. He was right.
However, currently such a requirement does exist and more and more
supervisory boards ask the question: what does that really mean? Ok, we have
such numbers, but how does that translate into our position within the
industry? What is our position with respect to global benchmarks?
The increasing demands with respect to the quantity and quality of information that
is presented to the AC form the basis for redefining the contacts with the
independent auditor. More wide-ranging questions can now be asked: ‘‘What is the
essence of the involvement of an independent auditor in the process of investigating
a company?’’ and ‘‘Does the investigation contract also include delivering
additional information upon the request of the AC?’’ Undoubtedly, increasing the
expectations regarding the scope of the information provided creates a conflict of
interests. If the additional information is delivered within the scope of the standard
service provided by the auditor, this will cause the auditor to eventually protest
(assuming that the fee for the service does not take into account such additional
tasks). However, this can also directly cause an increase in the value of the
additional service provided outside the scope of the audit and can change the
income structure of the auditing company, which, in turn, may cause a greater
reliance of auditing companies on additional forms of services and make them less
independent. This is a relatively new phenomenon, so it is difficult in the current
situation to assess the potential threat to the independence of the auditor. However,
this phenomenon does need to be observed and analyzed.
A different picture can be drawn when analyzing the oversight of the internal
control. Internal control is considered by many respondents to be the domain of the
management board. Therefore, contacts with the internal auditors are rarer than in
the case of external auditors and are performed primarily on a case-by-case or
irregular basis. In only two cases did the respondents confirm meeting with an
internal auditor (or the oversight of internal control) on a regular basis. In two other
cases, the AC was not meeting with the internal auditor at all. All the respondents
expressed the delicacy of not placing the internal auditor in an uncomfortable
situation of ‘‘being forced to spy on their employer—the management board.’’
Participant 1:
This is a very recent issue. It started just this year. We met the internal auditor,
we agreed on the analysis of the control procedures and the internal audit. But
we are still discussing how we are supposed to cooperate with the internal
auditor. How do we ask a simple question? Shall we meet without the
management present? It is obvious that we should meet the auditor alone, but
how we do this is not so clear. If we meet without the management, the
internal auditor can be treated as an internal cheater. This is a very delicate
matter and this issue is on our agenda at this moment. But the AC will have to
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meet with the internal auditor and internal control and better understand their
role in the organization.
The AC typically met with an internal auditor in the presence of the management
board; however, in some cases they also had the option to meet without the board.
The oversight can also be described as fragmentary. Only one respondent stated that
the analysis and control of post-audit activities were analyzed on a regular basis. In
most cases, the AC relied on the judgment of the external auditor or did not oversee
the internal control at all.
5.2 Resources to perform the oversight of financial reporting and external
auditors (Q2)
The literature on the effectiveness of ACs stresses the importance of adequate
resources and the presence of independent members on the committee (DeZoort
et al. 2002; Cohen et al. 2010).
This study also reveals that AC resources varied across different companies. In
the case of larger companies and for those with a foreign investor as a dominant
shareholder, the ACs generally enjoyed more resources than other companies.
However, in both types of companies, financial literacy and financial expertise were
considered the most critical factors affecting the efficiency of AC oversight and
monitoring duties.
Although independence is a relatively new concept in the Polish capital market, it
is considered an important factor by AC members. However, the interviews
revealed that the understanding of the meaning of independence in Poland is slightly
different from the EU definition and the charters and reports. The respondents
stressed independence as a ‘‘state of mind,’’ in which a non-independent AC
member can be independent in her/his judgment while simultaneously having the
necessary knowledge related to the activities of the company to exercise effective
oversight. In that sense, an independent member is someone who is unafraid to ask
difficult questions and raise ‘‘uncomfortable’’ issues amid the silence of the other
members.
Participant 10:
Generally, shareholders want to have not only an independent member but
also an acquiescent member at the same time. Recently, I was interviewed as a
candidate for an independent member and I was asked to what degree I would
be independent, if I would also be thinking about the interest of the majority
shareholder who owns 70 % of the company’s shares. My answer was that I
will be completely independent and will not be thinking of their interest at all.
A board member, according to the Commercial Code, should think only about
the interest of the company and not about the interests of the owners. Let the
owners think about his/her interests. We ended up in a long discussion because
the panel members did not know what the interest of the company is and how
it is different from the interest of the owners. For independent members, it is a
matter of the state of mind. It is a very important institution; however, one has
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to remember the independent member becomes dependent with time. After
two terms as an independent member, you become dependent: you like the
company, you like the members of the management board, you trust them and
you get used to them, and therefore, you become less alert. In my opinion, a
rotation of independent board members should be compulsory.
Independence was also often connected with the notion of the knowledge and
skills of the AC member. Financial literacy allowed an AC member to know what
questions to ask, but independence allowed them to actually ask the questions. As
one of the respondents explained:
Participant 7:
We can discuss independence for hours, but in practice it is important if such a
member is able to ask difficult questions that all the other members are
uncomfortable with. But these questions must be asked to determine the real
problem. Without competences, one would not know what question to ask, but
without independence, even if one knows what question to ask, one would not
verbalize the question.
Another important issue raised by the respondents related to expertise in
accounting and finance. The Polish regulation stipulated that at least one AC
member should have formal qualifications in accounting and finance. However, the
respondents argued that possessing qualifications in accounting and finance was
insufficient for the effective oversight of financial matters. They stressed
competence in accounting and finance as a precondition, which is consistent with
the EU recommendations (Official Journal of the European Union 2005), combined
with business experience.
Participant 16:
The EU directive talks about competencies, but the Auditing Act talks about
qualifications. Neither of them mention knowledge and skills. In my opinion,
competencies are more important than qualifications. Therefore, I try to be
liberal in that respect. I focus on the competencies of a candidate, accepting,
for instance, undergraduate accounting courses as proof of formal
qualifications.
On average, ACs met four times a year, but additional meetings could be
scheduled if necessary. In the case of companies with a dominant foreign investor,
the average number of meetings was higher. The AC members also communicated
between meetings, typically by phone and less frequently by email. The respondents
often suggested that the actual number of meetings depended on the involvement of
the chair of the committee (one of the respondents initiated 27 AC meetings in one
financial year). The agenda was usually set by the chair of the committee; however,
the other members of the AC could add additional points to the agenda if necessary.
In some cases, a new topic could also be added to the agenda by a member of the
management board. In other cases, a new topic could be added by a member of the
supervisory board who was not a member of the AC. The scope of the information
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received before the meeting was different and depended on the size of the company
and the availability of other resources. The larger companies with a dominant
foreign investor seemed to have more material provided to them before the meeting
(in an extreme case, the AC member could have 200 pages to read, with an average
of 20–30 pages). The material usually arrived 1 week before the AC meetings,
which was considered by many AC members to be too late because it did not allow
them sufficient time to become familiar with the content.
Participant 1:
In almost all companies, the information we get is late. This is an old trick,
isn’t it? But I do not think it is mean. The truth is that we have too many points
on the agenda and the company has a problem with the production of
documents on time. In the largest companies, there are a number of people
working for the supervisory board. In smaller companies, the management
boards are supervising the preparation of the package, and in most cases it is
ready 3–4 days before the meeting. So, most of the supervisory board
members get familiar with the package on the train travelling to the meeting.
With the limited time they had to analyze pre-meeting packages, the AC
members frequently looked for exceptions and contradictory evidence.
5.3 Critical factors affecting the efficiency of AC (Q3)
Both practitioners and the academic literature in the US and the UK have examined the
effectiveness of ACs. A variety of characteristics have been considered to influence
the effectiveness of AC members. The data revealed that the perceived efficiency of
ACs has increased over time and is associated with the power of the AC members.
In general, the respondents agreed that institutions such as board committees
(including ACs) add to the efficiency of corporate governance. They stressed that
the size of the monitoring body matters because a large supervisory board makes
the responsibilities more ambiguous. It can be observed that board sizes are
decreasing. As a result of the introduction of new AC regulations, the size of the
supervisory board has decreased to 5 members in some cases. This is because of a
rule that states that a supervisory board with only 5 members does not necessarily
constitute an AC.
In the past, supervisory boards were much larger; a board with 17 members was not
uncommon. There were various reasons for such a large size; participation on a board
was considered additional income for little responsibility. In many cases, investors
treated an offer of participation on the board as a special bonus for a person they
considered important or who had an important social network that could be of use. The
development of the capital market and the introduction of the new regulations placed
serious responsibilities on the supervisory board, making its members as responsible
for financial reporting as management. Thus, the size of the board decreased to the
number of members who could effectively contribute to its work.
These recent changes, including the requirement of constituting an AC, are
considered additional changes that increase the effectiveness of corporate
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governance. Many respondents believed that the committees, including ACs, could
direct their attention to the responsibilities assigned to them and felt greater
responsibility for their actions. One of the respondents stated:
Respondent 1
As a separate institution, an AC has more power—perhaps not power per se,
but better possibilities and better-assigned responsibilities. The AC members
know that they should pay special attention to the finances of the firm and the
firm’s financial reporting. This is something that motivates better and harder
work because the AC member feels direct responsibility of being a member of
the AC. If I feel stronger responsibility, I try to do better job on the one hand,
but on the other hand I can have more of a voice in the discussion with the
management of the firm.
Although independence was stressed as an important factor in AC effectiveness,
it seems that the meaning of independence was understood differently from the
regulations. Independence as a ‘‘state of mind which allows asking uncomfortable
questions’’ was often stressed, whereas independence in light of the regulatory
definition was often associated with insufficient competency in performing the
duties of an AC member.
Because the dominant shareholder influenced the choice of supervisory board
members to a great extent, the role of an independent member was often played by an
academic professor of economics or management who formally met the criteria of the
formal definition but could remain a part of the social network of the majority
shareholder. This role could also be played by a quasi-professional board member, a
professional consultant specializing in accounting or finance (very often with the
qualifications of a financial analyst) who earned a living serving on a number of
supervisory boards. These members would normally serve on ACs as independent
members and simultaneously satisfied the second requirement of having appropriate
qualifications in accounting and finance. In general, this was not regarded as a
drawback. Academics are generally considered good contributors to an AC, as one
respondent explained:
Participant 8:
I think that with the professionalization of the world, the value of people such as
those coming from academia, is great. They can still ask an important question.
They do not think in a typical way. They do not function well in the world of
procedures, but they ask questions which the other AC members would not
ask… It is worth stressing that this is also an important place for academics, as it
is a place where they can learn about business fairly quickly. On top of the truly
difficult and time-demanding work as a AC member, one can see everything,
like a microworld from all possible perspectives. One can see the emotional side
of business, taking tremendous pride and great vanity in the owners and/or
management. You can see everything as a member of the board.
One respondent indicated that an effective AC is a committee that has a broad set of
competencies because this level of diversity helps combine different experiences
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and perceptions to better see the entire picture of the company. AC members with
experience in smaller companies (often with a local dominant shareholder)
suggested that the efficiency depended to a great extent on the type of shareholding.
Without a doubt, competence and independence were considered the most important
characteristics, but demanding owners could also affect the overall efficiency of the
AC in particular and the board in general.
Many respondents mentioned that a critical success factor for an efficient AC was
the power of the chair. One of the respondents stated ‘‘a chair is a guardian of
effectiveness.’’ The chair was considered to be the person responsible for the quality
of the work performed because the chair sets the agenda, chairs the meeting, gives
voice to the members of the AC during the meeting, and decides in some cases on
the need for and type of voting. One of the respondents described the chair as
someone who should give support to other AC members and who, with the support
of a good lawyer, can push things forward.
6 Discussion
As suggested by Gendron (2009:128), a single theory should not be expected to
explain the results obtained in a study; in fact, diverse theories can be employed
simultaneously to describe a given reality. The literature reveals that researchers
have utilized a number of theoretical approaches to study and explain AC practices,
such as agency, institutional, and efficiency perspectives (Cohen et al. 2010;
Beasley et al. 2009; Spira 1999). A different approach used in other studies was
connected with the application of sociological perspectives to study corporate
governance and AC practices in particular (Gendron and Be´dard 2006).
According to agency theory, the AC is an independent monitor of management.
Without a monitor, management may act in their best personal interests and not in
the interests of the principals (shareholders) (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and
Jensen 1983). Thus, the role of the supervisory board and its sub-committees
(including an AC) is to independently monitor management to prevent possible
opportunistic behavior. Efficiency theory considers organizations as rational actors
and points to the gains in effectiveness or efficiency following the adoption of a new
practice (Bo¨hm et al. 2013), whereas institutional theory looks at changes in
organizational processes over time (Cohen et al. 2002, 2007) and how existing
structures fulfill ritualistic roles to help legitimize the interaction among various
participants of the organization. In this view, ACs may be coerced into becoming
similar through regulation, following the best practice model or by simply
mimicking other organizations to enhance their legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell
1983; Cohen et al. 2007). The AC is often ceremonial in nature, with a focus on
providing symbolic legitimacy but not necessarily vigilant monitoring (Spira 1999).
When the AC plays a more ceremonial role, the external auditor bears a greater
responsibility for reliable financial reporting.
The evidence collected in this study allows us to create a picture of audit practices
in Poland. It can be observed that some ACs attempt to be effective monitors of
management, as suggested by agency theory. These ACs actively oversee the
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financial reporting of the company and actively monitor the external auditor. They
also play a key role in the external auditor selection process. This is particularly true
for ACs in companies with foreign investors that hold a majority of company shares.
These owners are highly interested in maintaining effective control over their
investment. In the case of concentrated ownership, in which the majority of shares
are in the hands of management or an entrepreneurial family, there is less need to
introduce effective monitoring devices. In these cases, control can be implemented
through direct or indirect involvement in company management or control.
However, there are a number of cases in which a major owner who used to be the
CEO of a company becomes chair of the supervisory board upon retirement. In these
cases, the AC plays a more ceremonial role and can be considered an ineffective tool
in the oversight of financial reports and external auditors. In these cases, the AC
relies to a great extent on external auditor reports in performing their oversight roles
with respect to financial reporting, while leaving the external auditor selection to the
management of the company. This is where the institutional theory may be more
useful in explaining the reality of an AC’s function. The existence of an AC and its
practices in these cases are to a great degree determined by the new regulations that
requiring implementation of an AC and where the company wants to comply with the
letter of law. The ACs in these instances often mimic the practices of other ACs to
enhance their legitimacy. However, the actions taken are frequently intended to be
symbolic and are not vigilant monitoring actions.
The gradual change in the processes of ACs and the perceived shift from symbolic
legitimacy to effective monitoring (as described by the agency perspective) can also be
explained through the lens of efficiency theory (Bo¨hm et al. 2013). Once the AC begins
its symbolic oversight and basic procedures are introduced to legitimize it, certain
practices may eventually be found useful for monitoring a company’s activities. As a
result, a given practice introduced as a result of new regulations or from the example of
a different company, may be considered to be useful and value-adding, which will
foster better monitoring. The practice may be used to more effectively monitor a
company’s management because the actors in corporate governance see additional
gains in effectiveness. According to efficiency theory, an intended symbolic process
may, with time, become a significant tool of effective monitoring.
The evidence collected with respect to AC effectiveness in the countries
characterized by the Anglo-American corporate governance model is mixed. For
instance, Spira (1999, 2002) documented a more ceremonial role for the AC in the
UK that was based on a study conducted prior to 2002. Other authors noted informal
interactions and communications in accomplishing AC objectives (Gendron and
Be´dard 2006; Turley and Zaman 2007). The most recent study, based on US data
(Beasley et al. 2009), suggests that many AC members strive to provide effective
monitoring of financial reporting and to avoid serving on a ceremonial AC. The
authors conclude that both substantive monitoring and ceremonial actions of ACs can
be observed by analyzing AC processes. The authors suggest a shift toward more
substantive oversight in the post-SOX era, with variations across different oversight
processes. This change can be associated with the pressure of reforms on corporate
governance systems, but can also be attributed to the development of AC practices
over an extended period of time.
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Outside of the Anglo-American corporate governance model, the AC is a relatively
new phenomenon that has developed slowly in the post-SOX period due to the global
trend of reforming corporate governance systems (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2009).
Companies with a large percentage of shares owned by foreign investors seem to be
examples of effective monitoring, including active and efficient ACs. Foreign investors
typically have a direct incentives to develop monitoring devices and have substantial
experience in the introduction of monitoring mechanisms to safeguard their interests in
subsidiaries. This practice is also observed in the case of ACs, in which the practices
have been copied from headquarters. In the case of smaller listed companies with
dominant local ownership, the ACs, if they exist, play an informal role in many cases;
however, the degree of formality in AC practices typically increases over time.
In general, the interview data indicate that AC processes are informal in nature.
However, the respondents stressed that the substance of oversight changed with time
and that the processes became more formal. The informality of AC processes can be
associated with the stage of development of the corporate governance mechanism,
but can also be a signal of the refusal to directly adopt the foreign concept imposed
by EU regulations. Because the Polish corporate governance model is characterized
by the dominant ownership of large shareholders who enjoy easy access to the
company, the need for better investor protection through better financial oversight
processes may not be so evident. Conversely, however, minority investors do not
have sufficient power to enforce effective monitoring by an AC.
One additional point to consider is the influence of culture on the adoption of a
new practice. It is difficult to successfully promote the AC as a necessary mechanism
of shareholder protection when the concept is not embedded in the business culture.
In fact, ACs are often understood as a costly burden that must be adopted and
enforced as a result of global efforts to strengthen corporate governance systems or as
a solution enforced by a pan-national regulator. The perception of the role of an AC
in the insider model was summarized by a respondent.
Participant 1:
It does not matter if it makes sense or not. This is not important now. This is a
legal requirement now. This is a result of all those scandals from recent years.
Perhaps in the long run, this may make sense, but in the short run, this is
something like ‘‘all bark and no bite’’. No one is eager to serve on an AC, and
only a few of us feel we are professional in performing our duties.
7 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature by providing insights into the specific aspects
of effectiveness of ACs by focusing on the AC oversight of financial reporting and
external auditors in a country that does not follow the Anglo-Saxon model of
corporate governance. Polish corporate governance is characterized as an ‘‘insider’’
model of corporate governance with a high concentration of ownership.
An in-depth analysis of the AC oversight processes indicates that development of
ACs and of the processes of forming relations and collaborations between ACs and
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external auditors remains in an early phase. In the companies investigated, a range
of practices may be observed from a merely formal involvement of the AC in the
supervision of the reporting process and the work of independent auditors that
sometimes has moved toward a more professional approach. This characterization,
however, greatly depends on the size of the organizations and the type of ownership.
Our study also illustrates that the current practice has difficulties maintaining the
development of corporate governance regulations, particularly those related to ACs.
The codification of the law mandating ACs is common in developed capital markets
and represents a milestone in the convergence of corporate governance systems in
Europe and on a global scale. However, this solution constitutes a challenge for the
economy in Poland because the corporate governance system is, to a great extent,
shaped by historical and cultural determinants, in addition to the development level
of the capital market. It should also be noted that previous studies show that
experiences with ACs vary from country to country, but in none of these cases do
the committees fulfill the hopes that are invested in them; however, there is evidence
that ACs are shifting from a mostly ceremonial nature toward the actual oversight of
external auditors and financial reporting.
For ACs to efficiently perform their responsibilities, they must have access to
greater resources, including organizational resources that would provide them with a
greater degree of independence in performing the functions entrusted to them. The
quality of the human resources is also important. Those who are exercising control
over the auditor should have adequate knowledge, experience and skills in the fields
of accounting, financial auditing and finance. It is also important that the auditor
respects the expertise of the AC members. Moreover, AC members should realize
that supervision of the reporting and auditing process should not be treated on an ad
hoc basis but should typically occur for several hours four times a year. Perhaps as a
result of the increased expectations with respect to the tasks performed by members
of the AC, it should be expected that a group of quasi-professional AC members
will be form who will be able to ask the right questions and quickly pick up on
inaccuracies. In this way, the transfer of knowledge regarding the financial situation
of a company will not be one-sided.
Additional research into AC practices might shed more light on the development
of these practices over time. This paper does not provide information on the
involvement of ACs in the monitoring of internal auditors or on the broad set of
risks companies face. Another avenue of exploring AC practices might be the
sociological perspective, including the ways ACs use different types of expertise to
efficiently perform their duties, how AC members develop trust in the various
participants of a corporation, and how AC members reduce discomfort connected
with the performance of oversight and monitoring responsibilities.
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Appendix 1: List of interview questions
Panel 1: AC expertise and resources
1. Can you tell me about your professional experience?
2. Can you tell me about your governance experience?
3. How many years have you served on this board?
4. How do you understand the difference between expertise and general
knowledge of accounting and finance?
5. How do you understand the independence of an AC member? To what degree is
independence important in overseeing financial issues?
6. How do you understand the efficiency of an AC?
7. Which factors could increase/decrease efficiency of an AC?
8. How do you see the role of the AC in increasing the efficiency of the board’s
performance?
Panel 2: AC meeting process
9. How often, and for how long, does the AC meet? What types of meetings are these?
10. How is the agenda for the meeting set? Are changes to the agenda allowed?
11. What type of information package do you receive?
12. Do you maintain contact with the company between meetings?
Panel 3: AC involvement in external auditor selection
13. Describe the procedure for audit firm selection.
14. How many times, and for how long, do the AC members meet prospective audit
firms? Are all members of the AC involved in and present at the meetings?
15. What characteristics of the audit firm are important while making the choice?
16. How important are the following attributes of the audit firm? Please rank the listed
categories as 1 (very important), 2 (somewhat important) or 3 (not important).
a. The size of the audit firm ___________
b. The reputation of the audit firm ___________
c. The independence of the audit firm ___________
d. The industry expertise of the audit firm ___________
e. The audit fee ___________
Panel 4: AC Oversight of Financial Reporting
17. What financial reporting risk areas are reviewed by the AC?
18. How would you describe your relationship with the internal auditor? How often
do you meet? Information gathered?
19. How would you describe your relationship with the external auditor? How often
do you meet? Information gathered?
20. To what degree are you comfortable with understanding the entity’s key
financial reporting risks?
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